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1Why Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism are Incompatible 
Suppose that God creates ex nihilo a bronze statue of a
unicorn; later he annihilates it.1  The statue and the piece of
bronze occupy the same space for their entire career. If God had
recast the bronze as a mermaid, the piece of bronze, not the
statue, would have survived. As nothing can have and lack the
capacity to survive the same change, they are distinct. Yet many
philosophers find it incredible that two material things coincide
ever, not to mention for their entire career. Here we have an
apparently irrefutable argument for the apparently impossible
conclusion that distinct physical things coincide in space and
time.
Counterpart Theory (CT) offers a solution (see Lewis 1986,
sect. 4.5; Sider 2001, p. 113). Suppose that the statue and the
bronze are the same enduring three-dimensional object (three-
dimensional things persist by existing in their entirely at
different times). The statue cannot survive being recast as a
mermaid, the bronze can. According to CT, the first claim is true
because no statue-counterpart of the statue is mermaid shaped and
the second is true because the bronze has a mermaid-shaped bronze
counterpart. Counterpart relations are similarity relations. As
one thing can have resemblance relations to different sets of
things, depending on which of its features we emphasize, the fact
that the bronze can, but the statue cannot, survive the same
2change does not entail that they are distinct.  
It is well known, however, that the threat to the principle
of 'one object to a place' re-emerges. CT cannot by itself
provide a general solution to coincidence puzzles. Suppose the
statue and the bronze are the same persisting three-dimensional
thing. Suppose the counterpart theoretic account of the truth
conditions of modal claims is correct; consequently it is true
that the statue cannot survive radical shape-change but the
bronze can. God now (t10) recasts the bronze in a mermaid-shape.
As the statue cannot survive this change, it perishes; as the
bronze can, it survives. As the bronze, not the statue, has the
feature that it outlasts the statue, they are distinct. The
premisses entail that the statue and the bronze are and are not
identical. To preserve CT, therefore, we must reject either
three-dimensionalism (TD) or the identity of the statue and the
bronze. If CT and TD are both correct, two whole things coincide
before t10, the statue (y) and the piece of bronze (z).  
While this failure of generality is not itself a serious
difficulty for CT as an account of modal claims, it leads to one.
Counterpart relations are similarity relations, so z has multiple
counterpart-relations depending on which of its features we
emphasize. z is unicorn shaped (indeed, it is an artifact so
shaped for aesthetic reasons); so considered, z's counterparts
are y's statue-counterparts. y is a thing made of bronze
3molecules; so considered, y's counterparts are the bronze-
counterparts of z. As y and z are indiscernible as far as the
relevant counterpart-relations go, CT cannot explain why z
survives and y perishes. (If we insist that y thought-of-one-way
survives but thought-of-another-way perishes, we are denying the
Indiscernibility of Identicals (II), for the same thing does and
does not exist at t11.2 Further, as y and z are distinct, if y
survives qua thing made of bronze molecules, we are left with two
coincident pieces of bronze after t10, y and z.) Surely the
explanation of why z survives and y perishes is that z, but not
y, can survive being recast as a mermaid. It follows that the
truth-makers of these claims cannot be reduced to counterpart
relations; so CT is mistaken.
Might not CT at least deal successfully with the original
example of the statue and the bronze?  As God does not recast the
bronze, they are identical; if he did, they would be distinct.
They are contingently identical (see Gibbard, 1975). This leads
to bizarre consequences, however. It is now up to God, or myself
if I am a sculptor, whether one or two three-dimensional objects
came into being in the past. I might have retroactive powers over
the number of whole things that existed hundreds of years ago.3 
Confronted with fifty God-created unicorn statues, we should say:
'Probably some of these are identical to the constituting bronze
and some are not, but without foresight we cannot tell them
4apart.' There could be two whole unicorn statues, molecular
duplicates, only one of which is identical to the bronze. As all
of this is well worth avoiding, we should say that the statue (y)
and the bronze (z) are two, not one, whether or not God recasts
the bronze. 
This second failure of generality leads to another serious
problem for CT. In virtue of what are the statue and the bronze
distinct in the original example? The most plausible explanation
is that they are distinct because the bronze but not the statue
can survive being recast. But this explains nothing if CT is
correct, for, according to CT, the difference in persistence
conditions is consistent with the identity of y and z. Given CT,
in fact, the statue and the bronze are entirely indiscernible
throughout their whole career: they have the same monadic and
relational properties. It is no use objecting that y alone is
unicorn-shaped essentially; for this sort of claim is meant to be
cashed out in terms of CT, and z stands in the same counterpart
relations. Nor will it help to say that y alone is a statue, for
the real force of this is that y has its shape essentially. y and
z are both statues. Their diversity, therefore, is a primitive
fact if CT is correct; they just are distinct.
This leads to absurdity: we have no principled way to deny
an infinity of indiscernible statues and pieces of bronze in the
same place. Or two statues and three pieces of bronze, or four
5hundred sixty-three statues and seven hundred thirty-two pieces
of bronze; an infinity of possible worlds would differ in just
these respects. Once we allow that coincident indiscernibles can
'just be' distinct, the Lockean constraint that there cannot be
distinct coincidents of the same type (e.g. statues) becomes ad
hoc; for what motivates it but the concern that distinct
coincident indiscernibles are impossible? There are famous
counter-examples to the Identity of Indiscernibles (necessarily,
objects with all the same features are identical) that depend on
similar objects being dispersed in time or space (Black, 1952):
nothing can be at a distance from itself. Part of the
metaphysical importance of the principle of 'one object to a
place' is that it enables us to abandon the Identity of
Indiscernibles without accepting multiple indiscernibles in the
same place. If we abandon the principle, we avoid the absurdity
only by insisting that distinct objects in the same place must
have different features--the Lockean constraint, which is
undercut by CT. 
The best damage control available to counterpart theorists
is to admit that CT and TD are incompatible. But even if we shift
to four-dimensionalism, the counterpart theorist now must make
plausible his account of the truth conditions of modal claims.
Given its failure on the three-dimensional model, why believe it?4
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Endnotes
71. This is a version of an example from Alan Gibbard (Gibbard,
1975): we make a statue by joining two pieces of clay, so the
piece and the statue come into being simultaneously; then we
smash the piece, destroying the statue too.
2. Counterpart theorists affirm II. I set aside the response to
the argument against generality, above, that the statue and the
bronze are identical temporarily, which, on its face denies II;
also it violates the Transitivity of Identity.
3. I do not have this retroactive power if four-dimensionalism is
correct. Whether or not I recast the bronze at time t10, only one
whole thing (call it O) came into being an hour ago at that
location--the initial stage of the bronze and the statue.
4. Thanks to Berit Brogard for helpful discussions. Special
thanks to Judith Crane.
